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Religion and the Purification of Reason:
Why the Liberal State Requires
More Than Simple Tolerance
JOHN M. BREEN*

1.

INTRODUCTION

On Friday, September 17, 2010, a truly momentous event took
place in Westminster Hall, the ancient seat of the English Parliament.
On this day Pope Benedict XVI addressed an assembled group of British
politicians, diplomats, academics, business leaders and other
representatives of British society, including members of the present
government and four former prime ministers.' The event was all the
more remarkable in that it took place in a space swelling with meaning
in terms of both the political history of the British people and the
historic relationship between the Papacy and Christianity in the British
Isles.
The bishops of Rome have long taken an interest in England,
beginning with Pope St. Gregory the Great who sent missionaries to
evangelize the Anglo-Saxons in 596 headed by the future St. Augustine
of Canterbury.' Sadly, the bonds of full communion were severed with
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University of Notre Dame; J.D. 1988, Harvard University. I wish to thank Professor
Kevin Lee and the editors of the Campbell Law Review for their outstanding work in
putting together the symposium on "Liberalism, Constitutionalism, and Christianity"
that took place on March 18, 2011 and of which this Article is a small part. I also wish
to thank Mary Katharine Ludwig, Loyola Class of 2011, for her excellent research
assistance. I am especially grateful to my wife, Susan Nelligan Breen, and our sons Peter
and Philip for tolerating my liberal time away from them during the preparation of this
Article.
1. See John Hooper, POPE'S VISIT: BENEDICT TELLS POLITICIANS THAT RELIGION IS BEING
MARGINALISED,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/sep/17/pope-visit-keynotewestminster-speech?INTCMP=ILCNETTXT3487 (last visited Apr. 10, 2011); Foreign
and

Commonwealth

Office,

POPE

DELIVERS

CIVIL

SOCIETY

ADDRESS,

http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/news/latest-news/?view=News&id=22883287 (last visited Apr.
10, 2011) (listing Gordon Brown, Tony Blair, John Major and Lady Thatcher as
attendees).
2. J.N.D. KELLY, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF POPES 67 (1986).
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the advent of the English Reformation and the ensuing years of
suspicion, animosity, and neglect. Indeed, full diplomatic relations
between the United Kingdom and the Holy See were established only as
recently as 1982.
Yet here was Benedict - the Pope, the Bishop of Rome, the Supreme
Pontiff of the Universal Church and Successor to St. Peter - speaking in
Westminster Hall, the same forum where Parliament enacted the Act of
Succession of 1533 which annulled the marriage between King Henry VIII
and Catherine of Aragon and declared lawful Henry's marriage to Anne
Boleyn while at the same time prohibiting appeals to Rome;' and the Act
of Supremacy of 1534 which created the "Church of England, called
Anglicans Ecclesia" and then "annexed and united [it] to the imperial
crown" of the English realm, declaring Henry and his successors to be
"the only supreme head in earth of the Church of England";' and the Act
Respecting the Oath to the Succession of 1534 which, with the Holy See in
mind, required subjects of the realm to renounce the power of any
"foreign authority or potentate" and repudiate any oath previously made
to the contrary.' These formal acts of government - acts by a political
body upon and indeed purporting even to constitute a religious
community, acts that might charitably be described as driven by political
concerns and not theological ones - brought about a tragic division in
Western Christendom that endures to this day.
The significance of the venue and its meaning with respect to the
papal visit were not lost on Benedict who described Westminster Hall as
"a building of unique significance in the civil and political history of the
people of these islands" which has had "a profound influence on the
development of participative government among the nations, especially
in the Commonwealth and English-speaking world at large."'
Westminster Hall was also the place where St. Thomas More "the great
English scholar and statesman, who is admired by believers and non-

3. Pope John Paul
BRITAIN

TO

THE

II, ADDRESS OF JOHN PAUL 11 TO THE FIRST AMBASSADOR OF GREAT
HOLY
SEE
(Apr.
1,
1982),
http://www.vatican.va

/holy-father/john.paul ii/speeches/1982/april/documents/hLjpii-spe_19820401_ambassador-britainen.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2011).
4. Succession to the Crown Act 1533, 25 Henry VIII. c. 22.
5. Act of Supremacy 1534, 26 Henry VIII. c. 1.
6. Act Respecting the Oath to the Succession 1534, 26 Henry VIII. c. 2.
7. Pope Benedict XVI, ADDRESS TO THE REPRESENTATIVES OF BRITISH SOCIETY (Sept. 17,
2010),
available
at
http://www.vatican.va/holy father/benedict_xvi/speeches/
2010/september/documents/hf ben-xvi-spe_20100917_societa-civileen.html
(last
visited Apr. 10, 2011) [hereinafter WESTMINSTER ADDRESS].
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believers alike"' was tried and convicted of treason. For his offense
against the Crown, More was beheaded on Tower Hill, July 6, 1535.9
For his fidelity to Christ, he is recognized as a martyro and the patron
saint of lawyers, statesmen and politicians."
This fact and the Pope's remarks at Westminster directly address
the topic of our conference precisely because Thomas More is so widely
admired for "the integrity with which he followed his conscience, even at
the cost of displeasing the sovereign whose 'good servant' he was,
because he chose to serve God first." Thus, for Benedict, More's life
brings into relief in an especially poignant fashion "the perennial
question of the relationship between what is owed to Caesar and what is
owed to God," the issue of "the proper place of religious belief within the
political process."1
According to Benedict, "the fundamental questions at stake in
Thomas More's trial continue to present themselves in ever-changing
terms as new social conditions emerge.""
These questions include
"[WIhat are the requirements that governments may reasonably impose
upon citizens, and how far do they extend? By appeal to what authority
can moral dilemmas be resolved?" or "[Wihere is the ethical foundation
for political choices to be found?""

8. Id.
9. For accounts of Thomas More's life and times see E.E. REYNOLDS, ST. THOMAS
MORE (1958); GERARD B. WEGEMER, THOMAS MORE: A PORTRAIT OF COURAGE (1995);
PETER ACKROYD, THE LIFE OF THOMAS MORE (1998).
10. The Center for Thomas More Studies, HOMILY AT THE CANONIZATION OF ST.
THOMAS MORE, http://www.thomasmorestudies.org/rep..canonization.html (last visited
Apr. 10, 2011).
11. POPE JOHN PAUL II, APOSTOLIC LETTER ISSUED MOTU PROPRIO PROCLAIMING SAINT
THOMAS MORE PATRON OF STATESMEN AND POLITICIANS (2000), available at
http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/john.pauliilmotu-proprio/documents/hf jp-ii-motuproprio_2000103 1_thomas-more.en.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2011).
12. WESTMINSTER ADDRESS, supra note 7 (paraphrasing by Benedict of More's final
words on Tower Hill that "he died the King's good servant, but God's first"); REYNOLDS,
supra note 9, at 299; ACKROYD, supra note 9, at 405.

13. Id.
14. Id.

15. Id.
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Benedict makes clear that in the Catholic tradition "objective norms
governing right action are accessible to reason, prescinding from the
content of revelation." 6 Thus, in the key passage of his address,
Benedict says that:
the role of religion in political debate is not so much to supply these
norms, as if they could not be known to non-believers - still less to
propose concrete political solutions, which would lie altogether outside
the competence of religion - but rather to help purify and shed light
upon the application of reason to the discovery of objective moral
principles.1 7
Religion, he says, performs a "corrective" function in the political process
such that it "is not a problem for legislators to solve, but a vital
contributor to the national conversation."" As Benedict notes, however,
religion in general and Christianity in particular are often marginalized
so that the voice of religion is "silenced, or at least relegated to the
purely private sphere" often in the name of "tolerance."l 9
What could Benedict possibly mean by this astounding claim that
reason in public discourse must be "purified" by religion? What does he
mean in saying that religion has a "corrective" role to play in the political
process? In the essay that follows, first, I explore the meaning of this
provocative passage as elucidated in the other documents of Benedict's
papacy, in the work of Joseph Ratzinger prior to his election as pope, 0
and in the larger body of papal encyclicals, conciliar documents and
episcopal statements collectively known as "Catholic social teaching."2'

16. Id.
17. WESTMINSTER ADDRESS, supra note 7.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Joseph Ratzinger, the former university professor and Archbishop of Munich and
Freising, and longtime Cardinal Prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the
Faith, was elected by the College of Cardinals sitting in conclave to succeed the late John
Paul II on April 18, 2005. He accepted and chose the name "Benedict" in honor of the St.
Benedict of Nursia, the father of Western monasticism, and Pope Benedict XV, the pope
of Ratzinger's early childhood who worked first to prevent the outbreak of the First
World War and then to bring about a cessation of hostilities once the war began. See
Pope Benedict XVI, GENERAL AUDIENCE: REFLECTION ON THE NAME CHOSEN (Apr. 27,
2005),
available
at
http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/benedict-xvi
/audiences/2005/documents/hfben-xvi aud_20050427_en.html (last visited Apr. 10,
2011).
21. For a further description of the nature of "Catholic social teaching," the sources
it draws upon and the topics it frequently addresses, see John M. Breen, Neutrality in
Liberal Legal Theory and CatholicSocial Thought, 32 HARv.J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 513, 519-21
(2009).
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Second, I will show how much of what Benedict has to say about the
positive contribution religion can make to public life finds support in
two diverse sources - the commentary of Alexis de Tocqueville in
Democracy in America and the work of contemporary political theorist
Jeremy Waldron. Third, I will review the Supreme Court's recent
decision in CLS v. Martinez22 in light of the positive and corrective
function that Benedict says religion performs in the political process. I
end the essay with a brief conclusion that ties together the various
themes developed.
1I.

POLITICS AND THE INADEQUACY OF REASON ALONE

A. Drawing ProperLines: Eschewing Theocracy and Championing Natural
Law
The purifying effect of religion in public life that Benedict proposes
does not portend the establishment of a theocratic state founded on
Christian revelation. Instead, the role he envisions is far more subtle
and indirect. Although these points are implicit in Benedict's brief
Westminster remarks, they are addressed at greater length in the Pope's
other writings and in the Church's social doctrine.
First, since the Second Vatican Council, freedom of religion has
been a hallmark of the Church's social teaching. The Church recognizes
the right of "professing a religion both privately and publicly"23 including
the right "to seek the truth" and to "adhere to the truth, once it is known,
and to order [one's] whole [life] in accord with the demands of truth.""
While this right includes both freedom from coercion and freedom to act

22. CLS v. Martinez, 130 S.Ct. 2971 (2010).
23. SECOND VATICAN ECUMENICAL COUNCIL, PASTORAL CONSTITUTION ON THE CHURCH
73 (1965), reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL
IN THE MODERN WORLD GAUDIUM ET SPES
THOUGHT: THE DOCUMENTARY HERITAGE 166 (David J. O'Brien & Thomas A. Shannon
eds., Orbis Books 1992) [hereinafter CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT], available at
http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist-councils/ii Vatican-council/documents/vatiicons_19651207_gaudium-et-spesen.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2011) [hereinafter
GAUDIUM ET SPES].

24.

SECOND VATICAN

ECUMENICAL COUNCIL, DECLARATION ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

2 (1965), reprinted in THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II, 675 (Walter
available at
1966),
trans.,
Gallagher
Joseph
ed.,
Abbott, SJ.
M.
http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii vatican council/documents/vatii decl 19651207-dignitatis-humanaeen.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2011).
DIGNITATIS HUMANAE
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in accord with one's beliefs, even this solemn right must give way to
other compelling interests so as to ensure that "the just requirements of
public order are observed." 6
Second, that the state's obligation to preserve "public order" can
trump the individual's interest in "religious freedom" suggests two orders
of value - that which a particular religious community holds dear and
that which is common to all regardless of religious belief. The Catholic
Church has long understood that there is a "twofold order of
knowledge"27 deriving from "two cognitive fields," namely, human
reason and divine revelation.29 According to Benedict, the Church's
social teaching "argues on the basis of reason and natural law, [that is],
on the basis of what is in accord with the nature of every human
being."" As such, "it has no intention of giving the Church power over
the State. Even less is it an attempt to impose on those who do not share
the faith ways of thinking and modes of conduct proper to faith."3 1
Instead, "[tihis universal moral law provides a sound basis for all
cultural, religious and political dialogue" and is even "the precondition
for all constructive social cooperation."32
Third, in his Westminster address Benedict states that the role of
religion is not "to propose concrete political solutions."
From this
25. Id. (describing religious liberty as freedom from being "forced to act in a manner
contrary to his own beliefs" and as freedom to act in accordance with "his own beliefs,
whether privately or publicly, whether alone or in association with others").
26. Id.
27. FIRST VATICAN ECUMENICAL COUNCIL, DOGMATIC CONSTITUTION ON THE CATHOLIC

chap. 4, * 2 (1870), reprinted in DECREES OF THE ECUMENICAL COUNCILS
vol. 2 at 808 (Norman P. Tanner ed., 1990).
28. POPE BENEDICT XVI, ENCYCLICAL LETTER CARITAS IN VERITATE 1 5 (2009), available
at
http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/benedictxvi/encyclicals/documents/hfbenxvi enc_20090629_caritas-in-veritateen.htmI (last visited Apr. 10, 2011) [hereinafter
FAITH DEI FILius,

CARITAS IN VERITATE].

29. POPE JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER FIDES ET RATIO (1998), available at
http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/john-paul iiencyclicals/documents/hfjpii enc_14091998_fides-et-ratio_en.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2011) [hereinafter FIDES ET
RATIO] ("Faith and reason are like two wings on which the human spirit rises to the
contemplation of truth.").
30. POPE BENEDICT XVI, ENCYCLICAL LETTER DEUS CARITAS EsT 9 28 (2005), available
at
http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/benedict-xvi/encyclicals/documents/hfbenxvi enc_20051225_deus-caritas-est en.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2011) thereinafter
DEUS CARITAS ESTI.

31. Id.
32. CARITAS IN VERITATE, supra note 28, at 1 59.
33. WESTMINSTER ADDRESS, supra note 7; see also
at

CARITAS IN VERITATE, supra note 28,
9 ("The Church does not have technical solutions to offer and does not claim 'to
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comment alone it should be clear that the Pope does not envision a
privileged place for the Church or any religious body as the dispenser of
positive law or the effective arbiter of justice in the liberal state.34 If the
Church were to engage in proposing concrete solutions, if she were to
participate in the formulation of public policy directly then she would be
straying outside her field of competence. Instead, the task of "Ibluilding
a just social and civil order" is "a political task" and as such "cannot be
the Church's immediate responsibility." 5 Indeed, Benedict makes
emphatically clear the Church "cannot and must not replace the State"
that "the Church cannot and must not take upon herself the political
battle to bring about the most just society possible."36 Rather, "[a] just
society must be the achievement of politics, not of the Church" as such."
Accordingly, "[tihe direct duty to work for a just ordering of
society . .. is proper to the lay faithful" and other citizens." Instead, the
Church's mission is "to help form consciences in political life and to
stimulate greater insight into the authentic requirements of justice.
That is, "[tihe Church has an indirect duty ...

to contribute to the

purification of reason and to the reawakening of those moral forces
without which just structures are neither established nor prove effective
in the long run."' But what does this "purification" mean?
interfere in any way in the politics of states."' (quoting POPE PAUL VI, ENCYCLICAL LETTER
POPULORUM PROGRESSlo 1 13 (1967), reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra note
at
available
also
240,
at
23,
http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/paul-vi/encyclicals/documents/hf-pvienc_26031967_populorum-en.html) [hereinafter POPULORUM PROGRESSIOI).
34. If the Church were to assume such a role she would, necessarily be in the
position of imposing her views on those outside the Church. As Benedict's predecessor,
John Paul II was fond of saying "The Church proposes; she imposes nothing. She
respects individuals and cultures, and she honors the sanctuary of conscience." POPE
JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER REDEMPTORIS MISSIo 91 39 (1990), available
athttp://www.vatican.va/holy-father/john-paul ii/encyclicals/documents/hLjpiienc_07121990_redemptoris-missioen.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2011).
35. DEUS CARITAS EST, supra note 30, 128.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. 129 (emphasis added).
39. Id. 128.
40. Id. 129 (emphasis added). As Jean-Marie Cardinal Lustiger, the late Archbishop
of Paris, put it in his Erasmus Lecture, the Church's task is not to be involved in politics
"as simply one party among others. The Church's task, rather, is to discern and
denounce the alienations and seductions that destroy human liberty by severing it from
its divine source." Jean-Marie Cardinal Lustiger, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, FIRST
THINGS, Oct. 1997 at 38, 40, available at http://www.firstthings.com/article/2008/09/002liberty-equality-fraternity- 12 (last visited Apr. 10, 2011).
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Expansion and Purification: Correcting the Modern Understandingof
Reason

The boundaries of reason - the question of what constitutes
rational thought - has been a topic of great concern in Benedict's
pontificate and in the scholarly work of Joseph Ratzinger long before he
was elected pope. This concern was most famously on display in
Benedict's lecture at the University of Regensburg in September 2006.
Although the media focused on what it took to be Benedict's provocative
remarks concerning Islam, Benedict himself described the lecture as "a
critique of modern reason from within."' According to Benedict, the
modern conception of reason is based "on a synthesis between Platonism
(Cartesianism) and empiricism" which in the first dimension
"presupposes the mathematical structure of matter, its intrinsic
rationality" and in the second dimension maintains that "only the
possibility of verification or falsification through experimentation can
yield decisive certainty." 4 2 The understanding of rationality that emerges
from this synthesis holds that "[f]irst, only the kind of certainty resulting
from the interplay of mathematical and empirical elements can be
considered scientific," and second, that rationality "by its very
nature ... excludes the question of God, making it appear [as] an
unscientific or pre-scientific question. " Without "rejecting the insights
of the modern age" Benedict urges us to "broaden[] our concept of
reason and its application" by "overcomeling] the self-imposed
limitation of reason to the empirically falsifiable.""
There is, says Benedict, a human yearning to go beyond this narrow
understanding of rationality that still holds the high ground in
contemporary culture. Human beings find this restricted view of reason
overly confining and ultimately unsatisfying because "the specifically
human questions about our origin and destiny, the questions raised by
religion and ethics, then have no place within the purview of collective
reason as defined by 'science', so understood, and must thus be relegated

41. Pope Benedict XVI, LECTURE OF
UNIVERSITY

OF REGENSBURG,

FAITH,

THE HOLY FATHER AT THE AuLA MAGNA OF THE

REASON

AND

THE

UNIVERSITY:

MEMORIES

AND

available
at
12,
2006),
(Sept.
http://www.vatican.va/holyfather/benedictxvi/speeches/2006/september/documents/hf
ben-xvi-spe 20060912_university-regensburgen.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2011)
[hereinafter REGENSBURG ADDRESS].
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
REFLECTIONS
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Put another way, when rationality is
to the realm of the subjective."
"reduced to the natural sciences" it is unable to "answer the real
questions - like where do we come from, what am I, what must I do to
live properly, what am I here for at all.""6 Accordingly, "[t]he real danger
of our time, the crux of our cultural crisis, is the destabilization of
ethics" that results from the reduction of reason "to what is calculable."
We must instead "be converted again to a broader concept of reason; we
must relearn moral reason as something rational." 8 A conception of
reason that renders the perennial and unavoidable question of the
meaning of personal existence unintelligible can only be judged a failure
precisely because the human person gazes out at the horizon and asks
not only "How does the world work?" but "How should I live my life?" A
conception of reason that supports human inquiry into the material
world but dismisses the question of why human beings are drawn to
engage in such inquiry in the first instance, why they would consider
such inquiry a worthy endeavor, defies the longings of the human
subject and so cannot help but leave men and women frustrated and
unsatisfied.
At Regensburg Benedict further argued that we must "overcome the
self-imposed limitation of reason to the empirically verifiable" because
reason so conceived cannot operate in a way that is wholly consistent
with the method it champions as the exclusive means of obtaining true
knowledge. As Benedict explains, "modern scientific reason with its
intrinsically Platonic element bears within itself a question which points
beyond itself and beyond the possibilities of its methodology." 9 That is,
"[mlodern scientific reason quite simply has to accept the rational
structure of matter and the correspondence between our spirit and the
prevailing rational structures of nature as a given, on which its
methodology has to be based."" But the question of why the inherent
rationality of the universe must be taken for granted as an assumption "is
a real question, and one which has to be remanded by the natural
sciences to other modes and planes of thought - to philosophy and
45. Id.
46. JOSEPH CARDINAL

RATZINGER, SALT OF THE EARTH: CHRISTIANITY AND THE CATHOLIC

CHURCH AT THE END OF THE MILLENNIUM-AN

INTERVIEW WITH PETER SEEWALD

163

(Adrian Walker trans., 1997).
47. JOSEPH CARDINAL RATZINGER, CHURCH, ECUMENISM, AND POLITICS: NEW ENDEAVORS
IN ECCLESIOLOGY

204-05 (Michael

J. Miller et al trans., 2008) (1987) [hereinafter,

RATZINGER, CHURCH, ECUMENISM].

48. Id. at 205.
49. REGENSBURG
50. Id.

ADDRESS,

supra note 41.
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theology."" Modern reason, in other words, presupposes that which it
also rejects - something that cannot be verified or falsified through
experimentation, namely, the intrinsic rationality of matter and the
correspondence and receptivity of the human mind to that rationality.
Put another way, "[tihe real problem that confronts us today is reason's
blindness to the entire nonmaterial dimension to reality"52 of which the
very operation of scientific reason is an example.
In addition to calling for an expansion of reason beyond what is
empirically verifiable, Benedict has also called for the purification of
reason, and indeed this claim represents the heart of his remarks at
Westminster. He insists that "the role of religion in political debate
is ... to help purify and shed light upon the application of reason to the
discovery of objective moral principles." Without the corrective tonic
of religion, reason "can fall prey to distortions as when it is manipulated
by ideology, or applied in a partial way that fails to take account of the
dignity of the human person."" Thus, the idea of the purification of
reason has a specifically political dimension.
Justice is "both the aim and the intrinsic criterion of all politics" so
the state must invariably confront the question of what justice is and
"how justice can be achieved here and now."" This inquiry, says
Benedict, is a problem of practical reason, "but if reason is to be
exercised properly, it must undergo constant purification, since it can
never be completely free of the danger of a certain ethical blindness
caused by the dazzling effect of power and special interests." Religious
faith "liberates reason from its blind spots" and so "enables reason to do
its work more effectively and to see its proper object more clearly.""
C.

The Failuresof DistortedReason in History

Blindness is of course an inability to see, or an impairment of vision
so that one sees in only a partial and imperfect way. History has laid
bare the often brutal consequences that follow from the blindness of
reason gone awry. In his Westminster address, Benedict cited the slave
trade as an example of "the misuse of reason" that failed "to take full
51. Id.
52. JOSEPH CARDINAL RATZINGER, VALUES IN A TIME OF UPHEAVAL

trans., 2006).
53. WESTMINSTER ADDRESS, supra note 7.
54. Id.
55. DEUS CARITAS EST, supra note 30, 28(a).
56. Id.
57. Id.
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account of the dignity of the human person."58 In the case of slavery the
blindness of political reason is an inability to see the human person at
all. Instead of a man or a woman or a child, the slaveholder sees
property - an asset to be sold, a chattel to be used and exploited. The
same could be said of "the tragic and widespread scourge of abortion"59
which treats a living, albeit not yet born, human being as a "disposable
object."60 Elsewhere Benedict has argued that the modern cause of
environmentalism reflects a distorted form of reason insofar as it
considers nature "an untouchable taboo," as "something more important
than the human person" that leads to "attitudes of neo-paganism or a
new pantheism."
It is more often the case, however, that the blindness of reason in
contemporary politics is only partial as when the human person is
regarded "only as a producer and consumer of goods, or as an object of
State administration."6 The cure that religion offers for this blindness is
an anthropological vision - "a correct view of the human person."63 It is
the recognition of "man's creation 'in the image of God' (Gen 1:27), a
datum which gives rise to the inviolable dignity of the human person
and the transcendent value of natural moral norms."" Both consumer
capitalism and Marxism sought to "totally reduce[] man to the sphere of
economics and the satisfaction of material needs."65 But man is more
than "a producer or consumer of goods"; he is "a subject who produces

58.

WESTMINSTER ADDRESS,

supra note 7.

For an extended reflection on the
morality and legality of abortion, euthanasia and capital punishment, see POPE JOHN PAUL
available
at
EVANGELIUM
VITAE
(1995),
II,
ENCYCLICAL
LETTER
http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/john-paul-iiencyclicals/documents/hfjpiienc_25031995_evangelium-vitae.en.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2011).
60. Pope Benedict XVI, ADDRESS TO THE PARTICIPANTS OF THE SYMPOSIUM ON THE
THEME: "STEM CELLS WHAT FUTURE FOR THERAPY?" (Sept. 16, 2006), available at
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict-xvi/speeches/2006/september/documents/hf
ben-xvi_spe_20060916_paven.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2011) (organized by the
Pontifical Academy for Life).
61. CARITAS IN VERITATE, supra note 28, 148.
62. POPE JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER CENTESIMUS ANNUS 9149 (1991), reprinted
in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra note 23,
at 439,
available at
http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/john-pauliilencyclicals/documents/hf_jpii enc 01051991_centesimus-annus..en.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2011) [hereinafter
59. CARITAS IN VERITATE, supra note 28, 9175.

CENTESIMUS ANNUS].

63. Id. c 11.
64. CARITAS IN VERITATE, supra note 28,9 45.
65. CENTESIMus ANNUS, supra note 62,19 19.
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and consumes in order to live."66 Man is not "a molecule . . . completely
subordinated to the functioning of the socioeconomic mechanism."'67
Nor is he " a lost atom in a random universe: he is God's creature whom
God chose to endow with an immortal soul and whom he has always
loved."'
Here reason is purified by "[a] metaphysical understanding of the
relations between persons" as it finds "inspiration and direction in
Christian revelation" according to which inclusion in human community
does not annihilate the identity of the individual but completes his or
her being as a person.
D.

"I Was Blind But Now I See": The Corrective Lenses of Solidarity and
Subsidiarity

On the level of practical politics, this purification of distorted
reason, this cure from the blindness of ideology, can accomplish two
things: solidarity - something that the state can never achieve on its
own, and subsidiarity - something that the state often finds difficult to
accept.
Solidarity, says Benedict, is "first and foremost a sense of
responsibility on the part of everyone with regard to everyone."70 It is
not, said John Paul II, "a feeling of vague compassion or shallow distress
at the misfortunes" of others but "a firm and persevering determination
to commit oneself to the common good; that is to say to the good of all
and of each individual, because we are all really responsible for all."7
Moreover, as a personal responsibility it is not something that can be
"merely delegated to the State."72
66. Id. 39. As an "ideology" Marxism "presume[d] to imprison changing sociopolitical realities in a rigid schema." Id. 1 46. This kind of ideological blindness was
really "an inhuman philosophy" in that it rejected charitable efforts to alleviate suffering
under the "theory of impoverishment." DEUS CARITAS EsT, supra note 30, 3 1(b).
67. CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note 62, 13.
68. CARITAS IN VERITATE, supra note 28, 29.
69. Id. 53. For a discussion of the origin and meaning of the concept of "person"
and its meaning in the Christian tradition, see John M. Breen, Love, Truth, and the
Economy: A Reflection on Benedict XVI's Caritas in Veritate, 33 HARV. J. LAW & PuB. POL'Y
987 (2010).
70. CARITAS IN VERITATE, supra note 28, 38.
71. POPE JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER SoLucrUDo RE; SocLAus 9 38 (1987),
reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra note 23, at 395, available at
http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/john-pauLii/encyclicals/documents/hfjpii enc 30121987sollicitudo-rei-socialis en.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2011).
72. CARITAS IN VERITATE, supra note 28, 38.
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Political reason, illuminated by religious faith - and in particular
Christianity - helps to build solidarity. Thus, the corrective role of
religion is really a constructive role. It builds communion among
persons. It establishes the bonds of community. Living side by side
within the borders of the same political entity may "make [] us
neighbours but does not make us brothers."" Brotherhood - true
solidarity, real community - is not something that can be manufactured
or created by command. As such, it is not something that the state can
accomplish on its own with the limited means at its disposal: fear of
coercion, pride in the history and status of one's homeland, and mutual
self-interest. These methods of forging bonds between strangers may be
sufficient to meet the minimal demands of the common good, but they
are inadequate in the face of circumstances that call for profound
sacrifice."
Law treats people as "a group of subjects who happen to live side by
side," not as "a single family working together in true communion."" It
can make strangers into fellow citizens but it cannot make them into
brothers and sisters. It can demand that they treat one another with
justice, but not charity. As Benedict says, "[rieason, by itself, is capable
of grasping the equality between men and of giving stability to their civic
coexistence, but it cannot establish fraternity." Instead, "[tihe unity of
the human race, a fraternal communion transcending every barrier, is
called into being by the word of God-who-is-Love."" It is "loinly
through an encounter with God [that] we are able to see in the other
something more than just another creature, to recognize the divine
image in the other, thus truly coming to discover him or her and to
mature in a love that 'becomes care and concern for the other."'7

73. Cf. CARITAS IN VERITATE, supra note 28, 1 19 (referring specifically to the
phenomenon of globalization).
74. History bears this out. The leaders of the French Revolution knew that
something more was needed to bind people of the Republic together. "Liberte! Egalite!
Fraternite!" This was the cry of the first truly modem state - the state that sought to
sever itself from the religious and cultural milieu which preceded it and out of which it
grew. The leaders of the Revolution recognized that more than tolerance was needed to
sustain a society. The cry heard at the gates of the Bastille was not for "Liberty! Equality!
Tolerance!" Instead, the ambition of this first State of the modem era was to make men
brothers. It failed to accomplish this and resorted to the fear and coercion of the Terror.
75. CARITAS IN VERITATE, supra note 28, 1 53.
76. Id. 1 19.
77. Id.9 34.
78. Id. 1 11 (quoting DEUS CARITAs EST, supra note 30,916).
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This care and concern for others, this building up of the common
good that exceeds the demands of simple justice is what Benedict calls
"the political path ... of charity."79 It is actually necessary for men and
women to go beyond the demands of justice because "human need and
want persist even though no specific person fails to fulfill his obligation,
and even though no binding obligation can be construed for anyone."so
A society founded on reason alone - the calculation of justice - will
always be in need of more. Religion, and specifically Christianity, brings
love to the public square.
Subsidiarity, by contrast, is the principle of social organization
according to which it is wrong "to transfer to the larger and higher
collectivity functions which can be performed and provided for by less
and subordinate bodies."" Thus, says Benedict, it "fosters freedom and
participation through assumption of responsibility" and acts as "the most
effective antidote against any form of all-encompassing welfare state."82
The virtue of subsidiarity counsels humility. "We do not need a
State which regulates and controls everything" since such a bureaucracy
would prove tyrannical and would fail to provide "the very thing which
the suffering person-every person-needs: namely, loving personal
concern."" Political reason "must not consider itself omnipotent.""
Thus, Benedict concludes that "[1]ove-caritas-will always prove
necessary, even in the most just society. There is no ordering of the
State so just that it can eliminate the need for a service of love.""
E.

Religion and the Good Society: A Promise But Not a Guarantee

Although Benedict argues that religion has a corrective role to play
in political discourse, the presence of religion is not a guarantee to a
harmonious social order. In the case of Christianity, the Gospel may be
planted in a given culture, but its roots may not run deep. Religion may
be followed in a formal, even meticulous fashion "solely out of a desire

79.

CARITAS IN VERITATE,

supranote 28,

917.

80. JOSEF PIEPER, THE FOUR CARDINAL VIRTUES

81. POPE Pius XI,

112 (1966).

9179 (1931), reprinted in
note
23,
at
42,
available at
http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/pius-xi/encyclicals/documents/hfpxi_enc_19310515_quadragesimoannoen.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2011).
CATHOLIC

SOCIAL

ENCYCLICAL LETTER QUADRAGESIMO ANNo
THOUGHT

supra

82. CARITAS INVERITATE, supra note 28,19 57.
83. DEUS CARITAS EST, supra note 30, 1 28(b).
84. CARITAS INVERITATE, supra note 28, 9156.
85. DEUS CARITAS EST, supra note 30, 9 28(b).
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to be 'devout' and to perform [one's] 'religious duties."'86 Scrupulous
religious observance may be proper in a technical sense "but loveless" if
the Gospel message does not penetrate the hearts of those who hear it if the person who performs these acts does not also reach out in service
to others." In such an instance, the faith may have been shared but not
truly received by those to whom it was offered thereby preventing
religion from fulfilling the corrective role that Benedict envisions.
This failure frequently manifests itself as a kind of tribalism where
the factions are religious in nature, perhaps even specifically Christian.
Examples of this include the long-running conflict in Northern Ireland,
the civil war in Lebanon, the war between Croats and Serbs in the
dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, and the sectarian violence in Iraq
following the fall of Saddam Hussein. There are, of course, many other
factors that complicate these disputes. They are not purely or even
primarily disputes between religious groups as such. Still, if Benedict's
thesis is correct, wouldn't one expect to see its truth demonstrated in
history - evidenced in the facts on the ground?
The thesis that religion helps purify reason so that politics can fully
respect the dignity of the human person and advance the common good
does not lend itself easily to testing. We have, for example, no way of
knowing whether the conflicts just mentioned would have been even
more savage had religion not been present. The difficulty in testing
Benedict's thesis also derives from the fact that there is no society today
that is wholly a-religious in origin. Even avowedly secular states, like
the current French Republic, and overtly atheistic governments, like the
former Soviet Union, came into existence in societies that were once
deeply religious. These regimes were or are accretions on what had been
thoroughly religious cultures. Thus, Benedict argues that with respect to
the states in Europe, their ethical political discourse "is vitally dependent
on the ongoing effects of Christianity, which gave it the foundations of
its reasonableness and its inner coherence. When this Christian
foundation is completely removed, nothing is left to hold it together.""
The modem state "simply has to know its historical place ... the ground
from which it cannot completely detach itself without falling apart.""
Thus, the liberal democracies of the West are not proof of a benign
liberalism that is sustainable. By contrast, history does offer proof of the

86. Id. 18.
87. Id.; cf. Matthew 15:8 ("This people honors me with their lips, but their hearts are
far from me.").
88. RATZINGER, CHURCH, ECUMENISM, supra note 47, at 205.
89. Id. at 207.
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consequences that follow from a secular reason bereft of religion. We
have seen it in the ovens of Auschwitz and behind the barbed wire of the
Gulag.
Benedict is cognizant of the sort of religious tribalism that often
marks conflicts in the world today. According to Benedict, "distorted
forms of religion, such as sectarianism and fundamentalism" arise "when
insufficient attention is given to the purifying and structuring role of
reason within religion."90 This is why it is not only reason that needs to
be purified by religion, but religious faith that needs to be purified by
reason. It must be, says Benedict, "a two-way process."9' When aided by
reason, religion is able "to show its authentically human face,"9 that is,
to speak to all peoples and cultures as St. Paul did when speaking in the
Areopogas.93 As John Paul II warned, when faith is deprived of reason it
"stress[es] feeling and experience, and so runs the risk of no longer
being a universal proposition."" When faith is deprived of reason it
"runs the grave risk of withering into myth or superstition."5 Faith that
assumes the pathological form of fideism is incapable of contributing to
the public conversation in a society defined by pluralism.
III. ALLIES OLD AND NEW: DE TOCQUEVILLE AND WALDRON

The main point of Benedict's Westminster reflection is that religion
has a vital role to play in public discourse by correcting the distorting
effects of reason - that religion is necessary to supply that which is
absolutely indispensable to the political process but which the state
cannot provide itself. Although boldly stated, Benedict's thesis that
religion has an important role to play in the public square is not
especially new. What is interesting, however, is to see the diverse
sources who agree with the thesis that Benedict seeks to advance.
Alexis De Tocqueville is, if not the most famous visitor to America,
certainly the most famous political commentator to come to these shores
and subsequently publish his observations. Tocqueville's Democracy in
America is not merely a seminal work. It remains, perhaps, the single
most important study of American society and political culture more
than 150 years after it was first published. Of even greater significance,

90. WESTMINSTER ADDRESS,

supra note 7.

91. Id.
92. CARITAS IN VERITATE, supra note 28, 56 (italics omitted).
93. FIDES ET RATIO, supra note 29,136; cf. Acts 17:16-34.

94. Id. 148.
95. Id.
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at least for our purposes, is that many of Tocqueville's observations
concerning the role that religion played in the public life of the United
States in the 1830s coincide with the vision that Benedict recently set
forth in his address at Westminster.
Tocqueville writes that upon his arrival in the United States "the
religious aspect of the country was the first thing that struck [his]
attention,"9 particularly the way in which the spirit of religion and the
spirit of freedom were "intimately united" and "reigned in common over
the same country."" Indeed, he thought that "there is no country in the
world where the Christian religion retains a greater influence over the
souls of men than in America."98 This is not so much a "direct influence
of religion upon politics" but a powerful "indirect influence."" That is to
say, religion affects the "mores" or "habits of the heart" of the American
people, "the various notions and opinions current among men, and the
mass of those ideas which constitute their character of mind.""
According to Tocqueville, the positive effects of religion on American
life can be seen in helping to strengthen the bonds of marriage and
family life. There is, he says, no country "where conjugal happiness is
more highly or worthily appreciated" and that an "American derives from
his own home that love of order which he afterwards carries with him
into public affairs."'0 1 Likewise, Tocqueville says that religion effects
"habits of restraint" in political society and that this contributes to "the
tranquility of people and the durability of institutions."o102
Because of their "boldness" and "enterprising spirit" Tocqueville
believes that the United States could become a revolutionary power
around the globe. Absent religion "they would shortly become the most
daring innovators and the most persistent disputants in the world. But
the revolutionists of America are obliged to profess an ostensible respect
for Christian morality and equity, which does not permit them to violate
wantonly the laws that oppose their designs."103
Accordingly,
Tocqueville concludes that although "[rieligion in America takes no
direct part in the government of society . .. it must be regarded as the
96. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE,
1864) (1850).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 388.
99. Id. at 387.
100. Id. at 383.
101. Id. at 389.
102. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE,
1864) (1850).
103. Id.

DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA

vol. 1, 394 (Henry Reeve, trans.,

DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA

vol. 1, 390 (Henry Reeve,
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first of their political institutions; for if it does not impart a taste for
freedom, it facilitates the use of it." 0 4 Indeed, he says that Americans are
cognizant of this influence and so "hold [religion] to be indispensable to
the maintenance of republican institutions.""o'
Now, one might well question whether the bonds of domestic life in
America are as secure as they were in Tocqueville's day,' 06 as well as
whether Christianity operates to check the American impulse for
political adventure abroad."
Still, one can see in Tocqueville's
description of religion in America precisely the purifying effects that the
Benedict insists are indispensable to maintaining the dignity of persons
and the common good.
In a recent essay, Jeremy Waldron makes an analogous point.
Waldron objects to what he terms "prescriptive secularism," the point of
view that would "deny that religious convictions have any place in
politics."'0o His argument against this approach is not so much a matter
of principle as a strategic desire to introduce certain perspectives and
values into political discourse0 ' and so differs from Benedict's
epistemological argument in important ways. Still, there is a remarkable
degree of overlap between the two.
What Waldron finds so troubling is that when "[p]urged of all trace
of the view that there is something sacred in the poorest individual and
something blasphemous in our indifference to human need, politics
quickly becomes a playground for the selfish.""o
Prescriptive
secularism, he says, "deprives social justice of some of its most powerful
advocacy, advocacy of a sort that is politically, if not philosophically,
indispensable in the effort to open the eyes of the well-off to the plight of
those who are marginalized by the very structures that guarantee our
prosperity.""'

104. Id.
105. Id. at 391.
106. See, e.g., PROMISES TO KEEP: DECLINE AND RENEWAL OF MARRIAGE IN AMERICA
(David Popenoe, Jean Bethke Elshtain & David Blankenhorn eds., 1996). Of course,
some of the most devastating effects of marital breakdown are incurred by the children of
divorcing couples. See, e.g., JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN, JULIA M. LEWIS & SANDRA BLAKESLEE,
THE UNEXPECTED LEGACY OF DIVORCE: THE 25 YEAR LANDMARK STUDY (2001).

107. See, e.g., ANDREW BACEVICH, WASHINGTON RULES: AMERICA'S PATH TO PERMANENT
(2010).
108. Jeremy Waldron, SECULARISM AND THE LIMITS OF COMMUNITY, available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1722780 (last visited Apr. 10, 2011).
109. Id. at 23 ("These are strategic matters, not matters of principle.").
110. Id. at 2.
111. Id.
WAR
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Moreover, the Rawalsian thesis".. that public debate must take place
in terms of "public reason," mutually accessible to believers and nonbelievers alike, is misplaced. For Waldron, the fear that religious
convictions in the public square are unintelligible to non-adherents and
inimical to the process of reasoned dialogue, and that these convictions
do not lend themselves to the process of compromise endemic to
democratic politics "is based on a caricature of religious interventions, or
on a generalization from a very small and distorted sample."" 3 When it
comes, for example, to arguments against gay marriage, there is, says
Waldron, "very little Leviticus-quoting or invocation of papal authority"
as such. What one finds instead are "elaborate tissues of argument and
reason, open to disputation and vulnerable in the usual way to quibble,
rejoinder, and refutation.""'
That is, whether the subject is gay
marriage, abortion, or poverty, people who speak from a religious
tradition and out a religious motivation also speak in a way that nonbelievers (or rather other-believers) can understand and engage. Indeed,
their manner of speaking and arguing "is really not much different from
any body of value-laden political argument.""' To "shake up the deadly
combination of contentment and self-righteousness which often
characterizes the response of a prosperous community to the poor and
outcast"16 we want "something richer and more transcendent behind it
than the abstract idea of humanity.""'7 In the process of practical
deliberation "we don't just present propositions to one another, or
evaluate one another's evidence or logic: we try to affect the way things
are seen, the connections that are made, the value-language that is
used.""' To put it in Benedict's terms, religion serves a corrective role in
that it purifies the arid logic of reason that has lost sight of human
suffering and injustice.
Similarly, although Waldron does not invoke the language of
"solidarity" he does see that the invocation of religion can help overcome
the strict bifurcation between the virtues of justice and love. Secular
political discourse is, he says, rather one dimensional, presenting a claim
112. JOHN RAWLs, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 212-54 (expanded ed., 2005) (discussing the
idea of "public reason" as the foundation for the exercise of political power which all
citizens can be expected to endorse, regardless of the religious or "comprehensive" beliefs
they might otherwise hold).
113. WALDRON, supra note 108, at 15.
114. Id. at 16.
115. Id. at 18.
116. Id. at 19.
117. Id. at 13.
118. Id. at 19.
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as either "a perfect obligation (in which case there is a right)" or as
something unimportant that "falls into the realm of the optional."ll 9
Love, for Benedict, is something of the highest importance, though it
cannot be compelled by the state. As Waldron notes, "religious materials
shake up [the] logic" that distinguishes rights that others are obliged to
respect and merely optional life-style choices "by presenting claims of
love as compelling in ways with which secular moral philosophy may
not be comfortable, but in ways that may more accurately capture our
sense of what is required of us."'
Further echoing Benedict, Waldron
notes that just as "sometime[s] progress is made in moral argument by
developing new normative conceptions on the model of certain
religiously-inspired concerns," so too "progress can be made in
theological thinking by subjecting it to the rigor of analytic
philosophy."'' Thus it seems that Waldron agrees with Benedict that
"the world of secular rationality and the world of religious
belief. . . should not be afraid to enter into a profound and ongoing
dialogue." It is, as Benedict says, "a two-way process."122
IV. MAKING ROOM FOR RELIGION:

CLS v. MARTINEZ

If Benedict is correct that the secular, liberal state cannot sustain
itself by operating on reason alone, then certain consequences follow. If
it is true that, without the purifying influence of religion, the liberal state
is susceptible to an abuse of "reason," if it is true that, in the name of
tolerance, unity, and inclusivity it acts in a way that is intolerant,
divisive, and exclusive of select individuals and communities, then the
legitimate role of religion in public life needs to be recognized. If reason
is to operate free of distortion and ethical blindness then, as Benedict
says, "religious bodies - including institutions linked to the Catholic
Church - need to be free to act in accordance with their own principles
and specific convictions based upon the faith and official teaching of the
Church."'2 3
In light of this standard, how has the Supreme Court faired in its
recent decisions concerning religious liberty and the freedom of religious
communities? Specifically, what are we to make of the Court's recent
decision in ChristianLegal Society v. Martinez?

119. Id. at 20.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. WESTMINSTER ADDRESS, supra note 7.

123. Id.
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In CLS v. Martinezl24 the Supreme Court upheld the power of the
University of California, Hastings College of Law to require all registered
student groups to abide by the School's non-discrimination policy as a
condition for the use of school facilities. The School interpreted its
policy "to mandate acceptance of all comers: School-approved groups
must 'allow any student to participate, become a member, or seek
leadership positions in the organization, regardless of [her] status or
beliefs."" 2 ' The Christian Legal Society chapter at Hastings objected to
this requirement in that CLS required its members to adhere to a
"Statement of Faith" which included "the belief that sexual activity
should not occur outside of marriage between a man and a woman" and
that this belief precludes affiliation with "anyone who engages in
The Court concluded that
'unrepentant homosexual conduct.""26
Hastings's "all-comers" policy was reasonable and view-point neutral
under the Court's prior decisions concerning expressive association and
free speech in a limited public forum.127
There is much to criticize in the majority opinion, but my point
here is not to engage in an extensive review of Justice Ginsburg's
doctrinal analysis. Instead, what I wish to suggest is that CLS v.
Martinez represents precisely the kind of truncated secular reason in
need of purification. Moreover, it works to further marginalize religion
by restricting the free speech rights of a religious community, and by
reconstituting the community through a kind of forced association.
Benedict's address at Westminster suggests a different approach.
Just as the Christian religion in the past confronted distortions of reason
in the ideologies of Marxism and liberal market capitalism (that man is
only an economic being) and the new ideology of environmentalism
(that holds that man occupies no special place in the universe, that
humanity is merely one species among many), religion must be allowed
to confront the ideology of sexuality - the distorted view that a person's
identity is principally found in his or her sexual desires and the freedom
to realize those desires."' Related to this, religion also fulfills a
124. CLS v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).
125. Id. at 2979 (quoting the policy from Hasting's appendix to its petition for
certiorari).
126. Id. at 2980.
127. Id. at 2995.
128. CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, LETTER TO THE BISHOPS OF THE
CATHOLIC CHURCH ON THE PASTORAL CARE OF HOMOSEXUAL PERSONS 1 16 (1986), available
http://www.vatican.va/roman-curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc-con-cfaith
at
_doc_19861001 homosexual-personsen.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2011) ("The human
person, made in the image and likeness of God, can hardly be adequately described by a
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desperately needed corrective role in public discourse in arguing that the
family is not a mere social construct - a product of social and juridical
conventions and individual choices. Religion in general and Christianity
in particular has an indispensable role to play in correcting the
distortions created in the logic of an autonomy unburdened by any
notion of a natural order. In response to this, Christianity offers the idea
that the family is the "basic social structure" 2 9 of social life, the "natural,
primary cell of human society,"1o and that there is a complementarity
between the sexes' 3 such that mothers and fathers cannot simply be
swapped out for same-sex partners without having a profound effect on
the development of the children in their care. 32
reductionist reference to his or her sexual orientation."). A forthright repudiation of this
ideology does not entail discrimination or permit animus toward those who experience
same-sex attraction. Instead the Church teaches that "[i] t is deplorable that homosexual
persons have been and are the object of violent malice in speech or in action" and that
"Isluch treatment deserves condemnation" since "[iit reveals a kind of disregard for
others which endangers the most fundamental principles of a healthy society," namely,
the principles of justice and solidarity. Id. 9110. The homosexual person is, like every
other person, the subject of "loving personal concern." DEUS CARITAs EST, supra note
30, 28(b). Thus, although the Church condemns the practice of homosexual acts as she
has since the time of the apostles, the Church also teaches that men and women who
suffer from same-sex attraction "must be accepted with respect, compassion, and
sensitivity" and that "[elvery sign of unjust discrimination in this regard should be
avoided." CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 1 2358 (1994).
129. POPULORUM PROGRESSIO, supra note 33,9138.
130. POPE JOHN XXIII, ENCYCLICAL LETTER PACEM IN TERRIS 9 16 (1963), reprinted in
CATHOLIC
SOCIAL
THOUGHT,
supra
note
23,
at
131,
available
at
http://www.vatican.va/holy father/john-xxiiilencyclicals/documents/hf-j-

xxiii enc_1 1041963-pacemen.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2011).
131. See generally POPE JOHN PAUL II, LETTER TO FAMILIES GRATIssIMAN SANE (1994),
available at http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/john-pauliiletters/documents/hf jpii let_02021994families en.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2011); POPE JOHN PAUL II,
APOSTOLIC
EXHORTATION
FAMILIARIS
CONSORTIo
(1981),
available
at

http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/john-paul-ii/apostexhortations/documents/hf
ii exh_19811122_familiaris-consortio en.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2011).

jp-

132. CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING
PROPOSALS To GIVE LEGAL RECOGNITION TO UNIONS BETWEEN HOMOSEXUAL PERSONS 1 7
(2003), available at http://www.vatican.va/romancuria/congregations/cfaith/documents

/rc con cfaith doc_20030731_homosexual-unionsen.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2011)
(stating that "the absence of sexual complimentarity in [same sex] unions creates
obstacles in the normal development of children" in that children placed in the care of
gay couples "would be deprived of the experience of either fatherhood or motherhood").
Although proponents of same-sex-marriage routinely claim that parenting by same-sex

partners is beneficial to the children in their care and has no adverse effects upon those
children relative to children raised by traditional married heterosexual couples, "[t]he
most sound conclusion about gay parenting, reached not only by supporters of
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Finally, as should be clear from Benedict's remarks, solidarity is
essential to the well being of any society, yet genuine community cannot
be compelled by the state. It must instead be the consequence of
freedom. The state can command justice but not love. It can make us
fellow citizens but not brothers. CLS v. Martinez represents an effort by
the state to compel a kind of solidarity, to force a kind of fraternity on an
unwilling group. The state has a role in fostering genuine community,
but the attempt to bring about community through coercion is both
perverse and doomed to failure.
V.

CONCLUSION

Reason - certainly the constricted reason of empiricism that locates
the happiness of human beings in materialism and calculations of
utility - cannot redeem man. As Benedict says: "It is not science that
redeems man: man is redeemed by love."133
And so we return to the hall at Westminster and the figure of
Thomas More. His presence echoes through the space and through the
years as a reminder of the richness of a life not governed by the
impoverished version of reason that regards as true only that which is
traditional marriage, but also by those of gay marriage, is that we do not know the
ultimate effects on children of long-term rearing in gay households, with or without
marriage, with a few possible exceptions." Helen M. Alvare, The Turn Toward the Self in
the Law of Marriage& Family: Same-Sex Marriage& its Predecessors, 16 STAN. L. & POL'Y
REV. 135, 179 (2005) (summarizing the literature). One of the exceptions to which
Alvare refers concerning reliable empirical evidence on the effects of gay parenting on
children is Judith Stacey & Timothy J. Biblarz, (How) Does Sexual Orientation of Parents
Matter?, 66 AM. Soc. REV. 159, 170-71 (2001) (concluding that daughters raised by
lesbians are likely to have more sexual partners before adulthood, and children of both
genders raised by lesbians are more likely to experiment with or consider homosexuality
themselves). See also Walter R. Schumm, Children of Homosexuals More Apt to Be
Homosexual?: A Reply to Morrison and to Cameron Based on an Examination of Multiple
Sources of Data, 42 J. Biosoc. Sci. 721 (2010) (confirming a prior study that gay and
lesbian parents are more likely to have sons and daughters who are gay, lesbian, bisexual
or unsure of their sexual orientation). For an explanation of the difficulties involved in
researching the effects of same-sex parenting on children compared to parenting by
heterosexual couples, such as controlling for differences in levels of education and per
capita household income, see FULL INTERVIEW WITH DR. WALTER SCHUMM,
visited
(last
http://www.lifesitenews.com/news/archive/1dn/2010/aug/10081802
Apr. 10, 2011); Walter R. Schumm, FLAWED EVIDENCE ABOUT GAY MARRIAGE,
(last
http://www.mercatomet.com/articles/view/flawed-evidence about-gay-imarriagel
visited Apr. 10, 2011).
26 (2007), available at
133. POPE BENEDICT XVI, ENCYCLICAL LETTER SPE SALvi
http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/benedict-xvi/encyclicals/documents/hfbenxvienc_20071130_spe-salvi-en.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2011).
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calculable and empirically verifiable. He was, to be sure, a man
celebrated throughout Europe for his intellect, but also for his capacity
for friendship, his capacity for love.134 While imprisoned in the Tower,
just prior to his execution, More showed the depth of that love in a
prayer he composed, a Devout PrayerBefore Dying."' In it he prays for
the very men who have sought his blood and have now unjustly imposed
upon him the sentence of death. He prays:
Almighty God, have mercy on [these men] and on all that bear me evil
will, and would me harm, and their faults and mine to-gether, by such
easy, tender, merciful means, as thine infinite wisdom can best devise,
vouch-safe to amend and redress, and make us saved souls in heaven
together where we may ever live and love together with thee and thy
blessed saints. 0 glorious Trinity, for the bitter passion of our sweet
Saviour Christ. Amen.
In these final words he echoes the prayers of Christ Himself: "Love your
enemies. Pray for those who persecute you.""' This is something that
the reason of materialism and scientific method cannot fathom, but it is
the reason by which man is redeemed. It is the reason of love. It is the
reason that the world cannot do without.

134. Thomas More's friend, the great humanist scholar Erasmus of Rotterdam, wrote
that "[wihoever desires a perfect example of true friendship will seek it no where to
better purpose than in [Thomas] More." He was, said Erasmus "a man born and made
for friendship," "a man for all seasons." "No one," he wrote, "is more openhearted in
making friends or more tenacious in keeping them, nor has he any fear of that
multiplicity of friendships against which Hesiod warns us. The road to a secure place in
his affections is open to anyone. In choice of friends he is never difficult to please, in
keeping with them the most accommodating of men, and in retaining them the most
unfailing." WEGEMER, supra note 9, at 61-62.
DYING,
PRAYER
BEFORE
DEVOUT
More,
135. Thomas
http://www.thomasmorestudies.org/docs/A%20DEVOUT%20PRAYER.pdf. More made a
similar prayer at Westminster Hall at the conclusion of his trial. See WILuAM ROPER, THE
LIFE OF SIR THOMAS MORE 54-55 (Gerard B. Wegemer & Stephen W. Smith eds., 2003) (c.
1556), availableat http://thomasmorestudies.org/docs/Roper.pdf.
136. Matthew 5:44.
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